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Neurophysiological studies in human patients, with
experiments of the kind traditionally reserved for
monkeys, are beginning to provide valuable insight
into the workings of the brain. Taking center stage is
the question of which neurons lie at the heart of
perception itself.
Why do neuroscientists study the brain? It must be
conceded by even the starkest reductionist that our
fascination with the brain arises first and foremost
from a curiosity about ourselves. This is particularly
true regarding our perceptual experience — we
cannot fathom how a biological machine, regardless
of how complicated, can fashion our own subjective
impression of the world. For primates, including
humans, this impression is shaped primarily by sight.
It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that visual per-
ception has been the topic of studious research from
the time of the ancient philosophers to the present
[1,2]. Physiological inquiry into the brain, by compari-
son, is in its infancy. Only in the last decades have
microelectrode recordings in monkeys revealed the
wealth of areas in the primate brain dedicated to the
analysis of the visual world [3]. In these areas, single-
cell recordings have disclosed a systematic and highly
parallel strategy for registering and interpreting light
patterns that enter the eye [4,5]. But in spite of a
growing knowledge base of cortical subdivisions and
neural response predilections, many would argue that
we lack a fundamental understanding of the brain’s
approach to vision, including the mysterious nature of
subjective perception.
In recent attempts to address the neural basis of
perception, some animal studies have compared
patterns of single-cell activity directly to perceptual
experience [6,7]. Such experiments have generally
relied upon trained monkeys to make judgments
about visual patterns that are either inherently
ambiguous or at the edge of their perceptual abilities.
By matching up neural responses with the reported
subjective experience on a trial-by-trial basis, the role
of individual neurons in perception can be addressed.
Interestingly, many experiments suggest that activity
in the visual cortex is not simply a re-representation of
the original retinal image, but instead reflects some
aspects of how that image is actively interpreted —
what psychologists call perceptual organization.
Moreover, neurons carrying perception-related signals
appear to be neatly interwoven with those whose
responses can best be described as purely sensory,
making the link between neural firing and subjective
perception that much more complex.
This combined behavioral/electrophysiological
approach has been invaluable, but unfortunately it is
limited by the cognitive boundary inherent in commu-
nication between monkey and man (Figure 1). For
example, with a fair amount of training, a monkey can
respond to the question “Did you see A or B?”, but
never to the question “What exactly did you see?” In
the last few years, human subjects have played an
increasingly prominent role in the investigation of
brain mechanisms of perception, largely because of
the advent of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) [8]. But while the use of humans has provided
flexibility in the types of cognitive task that can be
investigated, the fMRI technique is currently limited in
its spatial and temporal resolution, making direct com-
parison with single unit data difficult.
Recent developments in human electrophysiologi-
cal recordings have added a promising new dimension
to the investigation of the visual brain. In particular, a
series of studies led by neurosurgeon Itzhak Fried and
colleagues [9–12] has systematically examined the
activity of single, isolated neurons that appear to 
be closely linked with perception (Figure 2). They
recorded neural impulses from electrodes implanted
deep within a part of the brain known as the medial
temporal lobe (MTL). This region, which includes a
portion of the cerebral cortex, as well as the phyloge-
netically older amygdala and hippocampus, is thought
to be critical for visuocognitive function, as bilateral
damage can lead to significant impairment in the
memory for objects and events [13].
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Figure 1. 
Neurophysiological studies of visual perception have
traditionally relied upon monkeys trained to report their
perceptual experience. Microelectrode recordings in human
patients are now beginning to address similar questions.
While fraught with practical obstacles, these experiments
have the potential to tap into aspects of our perceptual
experience that are inaccessible with the nonhuman primate.
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Fried and colleagues [11] previously discovered, not
only that that neurons in these areas respond to a
variety of visual stimuli, such as faces, animals and
spatial layouts, but also that the response of many of the
neurons adhered strictly to high-level categorical
boundaries. The same group then showed that selective
neural responses could, remarkably, be elicited even in
the absence of a visual stimulus if the patient was
instructed to conjure up a subjective impression of a
previously seen photograph using mental imagery [10].
Microelectrode recordings from the human brain
have a long but sparse history, and have come almost
exclusively from the need to localize seizure foci 
in epileptic patients [14]. These experiments are
challenging, requiring the use of sophisticated electro-
physiological techniques in a most inconvenient and
often unwelcoming hospital setting. The testing time is
extremely limited, and possible only through the gen-
erous consent of the patients themselves. Yet despite
these obstacles, Fried and colleagues have been able
to bring human recordings to a systematic level that is
directly comparable to studies in monkeys.
In their most recent experiment, for example,
Kreiman et al. [12]. examined the firing of MTL neurons
to patterns that were physically present, but percep-
tually invisible because of a visual trick called ‘flash
suppression’. Flash suppression is closely related to
the well-studied phenomenon of binocular rivalry,
where dissimilar patterns, presented separately to the
two eyes, alternate in their perceptual dominance [15].
Like rivalry, flash suppression is a paradigm in which
a single sensory pattern gives rise to two distinctly dif-
ferent percepts, and it can therefore be used to differ-
entiate between sensory-related and perception-
related neural signals [16]. With the patients sporting
stereoscopic glasses, Kreiman et al. [12] presented
one visual pattern to one eye, followed after a short
delay by a different pattern to the other eye, while the
first pattern remained present. Previous work has
shown that such manipulations consistently result in
the sustained perception of the latter pattern and
complete perceptual suppression of the former, despite
the physical presence of both stimuli [17]. 
Kreiman et al. [12] found that the activity of most
visual neurons throughout the MTL depended squarely
on the patients’ subjective percept — never would a
neuron respond to a pattern that was perceptually
invisible. These results are directly comparable to those
from an earlier electrophysiological study in monkeys
by Sheinberg and Logothetis [18]. In their experi-
ments, they also used flash suppression to bias per-
ceptual dominance, and recorded from neurons in the
inferotemporal cortex, an area with direct inputs to the
MTL. Just as in the new human study, nearly all recorded
neurons responded to an excitatory stimulus if and only
if it was reported to be visible by the monkey.
The results of Kreiman et al. [12] are important for at
least two reasons. First, they suggest that visually
responsive neurons in the MTL directly correlate with
phenomenal visual experience, thus providing an
additional data point for our growing understanding of
how neural activity contributes to subjective percep-
tion [19]. And, perhaps more importantly, these and a
handful of other studies [14,20] demonstrate that
microelectrode recordings in human patients can
provide valuable additional information for interpreting
experiments in monkeys. By using similar paradigms,
they can be used to assess the validity and generality
of conclusions drawn from animal studies. And 
by using techniques that are beyond the grasp of
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Figure 2. Single neurons recorded from deep within the human brain reveal category-specific responses to visual stimuli.
In this example, a neuron in the amygdala responded to pictures of animals, but not to other categories such as faces. Testing with
diverse perceptual paradigms demonstrated that the responses of such neurons are closely linked to the patients’ subjective per-
ception of the stimulus. For example, a neuron that responds selectively to animal photos might also respond when an animal is imag-
ined, but not when a face is imagined. Similarly, in the phenomenon of flash suppression, an excitatory stimulus fails to give a
response if it is not subjectively perceived. Key: +, excitatory neuronal response; –, no neural response.
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research in the non-human primate, such as visual
imagery, they can forge new ground in our under-
standing of brain mechanisms underlying human per-
ception and cognition.
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